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I. INTRODUCTION 
This term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in City of Hays, 
Kansas v. Vogt.1  In that case, the City is asking the Court to decide 
whether the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause (the “Clause”) 
applies to pretrial proceedings.  Prompting the Court to hear the case is an 
extensive circuit split.  The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have each 
held that a violation of the Clause may only occur at a criminal trial.2  The 
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and now Tenth Circuits, meanwhile, have held 
                                                                                                                       
 *  J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 2017; B.A., University of Virginia, 
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 1 198 L. Ed. 2d 781 (Sep. 28, 2017). 
 2 See Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] plaintiff may not base a 
§ 1983 claim on the mere fact that the police questioned her in custody without providing 
Miranda warnings when there is no claim that the [§ 1983] plaintiff’s answers were used 
against her at trial.”); Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[The plaintiff] 
does not allege any trial action that violated his Fifth Amendment rights; thus, ipso facto, 
his claim fails on the [Chavez] plurality’s reasoning.”); Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285 
n. 11 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (though distinguishing its case from Chavez, the 
court held that absent a coerced confession’s use at trial, “plaintiffs do not have a Fifth 
Amendment claim against law-enforcement officials who have elicited unlawful 
confessions”). 
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that certain uses of compelled or coerced statements outside a criminal 
trial violate the Clause.3 
It is not clear which side has the better argument.  The circuits that 
have contained a violation of the Clause to a criminal trial have referred to 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez v. Martinez.4  There, Justice Thomas 
suggested that the government violates the privilege only when it 
introduces the defendant’s testimony against him during a “criminal 
case”—an event that “at the very least requires the initiation of legal 
proceedings.”5  In support of this position, one circuit has added that the 
meaning of the Clause’s “witness against [himself]” limits the Clause’s 
application to within a criminal trial.6 
In contrast, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have 
declined to place such heavy emphasis on Chavez, looking elsewhere in 
the Constitution for an answer instead.  The Second Circuit, for example, 
referred to the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to conclude that, like an 
actual trial, pretrial “bail hearings fit comfortably within the sphere of 
adversarial proceedings closely related to trial.”7  Therefore, the Clause 
prohibits the use of compelled testimony in pretrial bail hearings.  The 
Tenth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in Vogt.  It noted that the 
omission of the words “criminal prosecution” and “trials” in the Fifth 
Amendment—words which appear in the trial-focused Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments, respectively—indicates that the Founders intended the 
Clause’s “criminal case” to cover more than the trial itself.8  Moreover, the 
word “witness,” the Tenth Circuit added, must extend beyond a criminal 
trial.9  After all, at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, criminal 
defendants could not serve as a witness at their own trial.10  To restrict the 
Clause’s application to criminal trials alone, therefore, would give a 
                                                                                                                       
 3 See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1027 n. 15 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(refusing to hold “that the right against self-incrimination cannot be violated unless a 
confession is introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial before the ultimate finder 
of fact”); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 171, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the use 
of a coerced statement before a trial or grand jury can violate the Fifth Amendment); Stoot 
v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that where “[a] coerced 
statement . . . has been relied upon to file formal charges against the declarant . . . .” the 
Fifth Amendment has been violated); Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
 4 See Renda, 347 F.3d at 558; Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513–14. 
 5 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2005). 
 6 Renda, 347 F.3d at 557 (citing Guiffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 7 Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172–73 (citing United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 323 
(2d Cir. 2004)). 
 8 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1242–44. 
 9 Id. at 1246. 
 10 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573–74 (1961) (stating that when the United 
States was formed, “criminal defendants were deemed incompetent as witnesses”). 
2018] Asking the Right Question in City of Hays v. Vogt 239 
meaning to “witness” that did not exist when the Fifth Amendment was 
ratified. 
Yet despite these opinions’ analysis, each overlooked a critical issue: 
the constitutional character of Fifth Amendment rules.  The failure to 
discuss the character (or nature) of these rules—namely, Miranda 
warnings11 and immunity—is significant.  Indeed, whether a pretrial 
hearing can give rise to a Fifth Amendment violation, this Article turns on: 
(1) whether these rules are guaranteed by the Constitution and (2) if they 
are, how broadly the Court is ready to interpret them.  Until now, no party 
to these cases has thoroughly discussed this detail.  It is important that the 
Supreme Court, set to decide Vogt this term, does not do the same. 
Part I provides the factual backstory to Vogt.  Part II then summarizes 
the Court’s views on the constitutional nature of Fifth Amendment rules.  
This Part investigates whether the Court characterizes Fifth Amendment 
rules as prophylactic safeguards, extending beyond the trial right at the 
core of the Fifth Amendment and thus lacking any constitutional 
significance of their own, or whether the Court considers Fifth 
Amendment rules, and particularly immunity, as part and parcel of the 
Clause’s constitutional promise. 
Part III continues that discussion, turning its focus onto immunity.  It 
will spell out important differences between use/derivative use immunity 
(the issue in Vogt) and Miranda warnings (the issue in Chavez v. 
Martinez).  The purpose of this comparison is to demonstrate that certain 
differences between immunity and Miranda warnings likely grant 
plaintiffs who successfully allege a violation of use/derivative use 
immunity (“immunity”) § 1983 relief.12  Thus, this Part suggests that, in 
cases implicating immunity, any interpretation of the Clause’s phrases 
“any criminal case” and “a witness against himself” should be co-extensive 
with the scope of barred uses under immunity. 
Finally, Part IV will complete the loop.  Part IV lays out arguments 
for whether the use of an immunized statement in a pretrial probable cause 
hearing violates the immunity doctrine and thus the Clause.  This Part 
reveals that an answer to this question implicates a complicated circuit 
                                                                                                                       
 11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). 
 12 A valid issue is whether, despite the availability of a § 1983 remedy, plaintiffs can 
overcome prosecutor’s absolute immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 
(1976) (extending the absolute immunity prosecutors enjoyed under common law 
malicious prosecution suits to suits against prosecutors under § 1983).  It is doubtful.  Of 
course, Vogt is a different case since the defendant in the § 1983 action is a municipality, 
which can be held liable under § 1983.  See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 
638 (1980) (“there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither 
history nor policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified 
immunity accorded the city of Independence by the Court of Appeals.”). 
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split of its own: what is the scope of immunity’s protection?  This Article 
submits that to arrive at a proper outcome in Vogt, the Court should answer 
that separate but equally important question. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In Vogt, the respondent, Matthew Vogt, had served as a police officer 
for the City of Hays, Kansas (the “City” or “Hays”).13  In a job interview 
with the City of Haysville, another jurisdiction in Kansas, Vogt revealed 
that he had, while on duty with the Hays police force, obtained and kept a 
knife.14  After the City of Haysville conditioned Vogt’s hire on the 
disclosure and return of the knife to the Hays police department, Vogt 
reported the knife to his superior in Hays.15 
Upon writing a “vague, one-sentence” statement about the knife,16 
the Hays police chief demanded that Vogt provide more detail or else face 
termination.17  Under this threat, Vogt complied.  Eventually, the State of 
Kansas, provided with Vogt’s statements by the City, pressed two felony 
charges against Vogt related to the knife, introducing the statements he 
made to the Hays police chief at a pretrial probable cause hearing in that 
matter.18  At that hearing, the court dismissed the two felony charges 
brought against Vogt.19 
With no criminal proceeding in the way, Vogt filed a civil rights 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 198320 (“§ 1983”) against the City, the City of 
Haysville, and four individual officers.21  The basis of Vogt’s claim was 
(1) that the defendants compelled him to make incriminating statements 
by threatening to terminate his employment if he did not do so; and (2) 
that those statements were used against him, contrary to the Clause, in a 
                                                                                                                       
 13 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1238. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1238. 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1983 reads: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive 
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively 
to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 
 21 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1238. 
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probable cause hearing.22  The federal district court dismissed each of 
Vogt’s claims, holding that because “the compelled statements were never 
introduced against [Vogt] at trial,” Vogt had “fail[ed] to state a violation 
of his Fifth Amendment rights.”23 
The Tenth Circuit disagreed in part.24  Though it dismissed the claims 
against the City of Haysville and the four individual officers,25 it 
concluded that, under Garrity v. New Jersey,26 Hays compelled Vogt when 
its police chief pressed him to provide a detailed statement or else face 
dismissal.27  City’s subsequent disclosure of Vogt’s statement to Kansas 
state authorities, the court added, began a series of events that led to the 
compelled testimony’s use in a probable cause hearing.28  Referring to 
holdings from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as its own textual 
interpretation of the Clause, the Tenth Circuit then held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s “criminal case” extends to probable cause hearings.29  Vogt 
had therefore made a valid Fifth Amendment claim against the City.30 
Now before the Supreme Court, the City does not directly contest 
that Vogt’s statement was compelled under Garrity.31  Instead, the City 
asks the Court to decide whether the Clause’s protection extends to a 
pretrial probable cause hearing.32 
III. THE NATURE OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RULES 
The first step to answering this question is to determine the genesis 
of the Fifth Amendment’s rules; in particular, Miranda warnings and 
immunity.  Determining whether these rules are non-constitutional 
prophylactics or are constitutional rules themselves (and thus a proper 
                                                                                                                       
 22 Id. 
 23 Vogt v. City of Hays, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132647 at *11–12 (D. Kan. Sep. 30, 
2015). 
 24 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1246. 
 25 Id. at 1246–49. 
 26 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1966) (an individual’s protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibits the use of statements obtained upon threat of removal from public 
office).  It is well established that a public official, asked to speak or face termination, does 
not need to invoke silence to receive protection under the Fifth Amendment.  The public 
official’s statements are automatically cloaked with use/derivative use immunity.  For 
more, see also Peter Westen, Answer Self-Incriminating Questions or Be Fired, 37 Am. J. 
Crim. L. 97, 103, 108–109 (2010). 
 27 Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1250–52 (concluding that “Vogt had adequately pleaded that Hays 
had started a chain of events that resulted in violation of the Fifth Amendment”). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 1246–52. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Resp. Brief for Petitioner at 2; Brief for Petitioner at 2, 11 n.1, City of Hays v. Vogt, 
138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16-1495), 2017 WL 5495450, at *3 n.1 (noting that Garrity 
immunity likely does apply to Vogt’s statements). 
 32 Pet. at 4–5. 
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basis for § 1983 relief) is crucial to deciding if the outcome in Vogt turns 
on the scope of the immunity doctrine itself. 
In Chavez, Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality comprised of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia, held that “rules [in 
Chavez, Miranda warnings] designed to safeguard a constitutional 
right . . . do not extend the scope of the constitutional right itself, just as 
violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the 
constitutional rights of any person.”33  One year later, in United States v. 
Patane, Justice Thomas continued this point.34  He again emphasized that 
the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda warnings “necessarily sweep beyond the 
actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”35  Various exceptions 
to the Miranda doctrine, he added, illustrate that the Clause does not, on 
its own, extend to pretrial events.36  After all, the Miranda safeguard, and 
its accompanying exclusionary rule, is only required if it protects the trial 
right at the core of the Fifth Amendment, he added.37  Where it does not, 
the exclusion of un-Mirandized testimony is unnecessary.38 
However, not all justices have joined Justice Thomas’s views about 
Fifth Amendment rules.39  In fact, besides Justice Thomas himself, no 
present member of the Court has ever fully subscribed to his Chavez 
opinion.  Rather, the Court today more likely fits between two opinions on 
the subject.  The first was articulated in Justice Souter’s Chavez 
concurrence, an opinion joined in full by Justice Breyer.  According to 
Justice Souter, though “the text of the Fifth Amendment . . . focuses on 
courtroom use of a criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating 
testimony,”40 out-of-courtroom “extensions” of the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee are constitutional decisions.41  Holdings that bar the compulsion 
of testimonial evidence in a civil proceeding42 require a grant of immunity 
to access a witness’s silence-protected testimony,43 or condition the 
admissibility of statements obtained by the police on the presence of 
                                                                                                                       
 33 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2005). 
 34 See 542 U.S. 630, 638–40 (2004). 
 35 Id. at 639. 
 36 Id. at 639–40. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 639 (citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Chavez, 538 U.S. at 778). 
 39 Between Chavez and Patane, the justices that joined Justice Thomas’s plurality 
opinions included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia.  Justices 
Souter and Breyer joined those opinions in part.  Of these members, only Justices Thomas 
and Breyer presently sit on the Court. 
 40 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777. 
 41 Id. 
 42 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). 
 43 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446–47 (1972). 
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warnings44 are no doubt grounded in the Clause, according to Justice 
Souter.45 
However, the constitutional character of these “extensions” cannot, 
on their own, award a plaintiff the exact remedy sought under § 1983.  
Absent a “limiting principle or reason to foresee a stopping place short of 
liability in all” cases where the government violated any one of these 
“extensions,” gifting plaintiffs with a § 1983 remedy for every Miranda 
violation is inappropriate.46  Put another way, Justices Souter and Breyer 
both agreed that permitting relief under § 1983 for Miranda violations—
an addition to Miranda’s exclusionary rule—was not “necessary in aid of 
the [Clause’s] basic guarantee.”47 
The second view, argued by Justice Kennedy, adopts a more 
expansive vision of the Clause.48  Unlike Justice Souter, Justice Kennedy, 
joined in parts by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, emphasized that the 
constitutional guarantee of the Clause is “traduced the moment torture or 
its close equivalents are brought to bear.”49  The Clause provides “more 
than mere assurance that a compelled statement will not be introduced 
against its declarant in a criminal trial.”50  Instead, it is a substantive 
restraint on the conduct of government, with violations potentially 
accruing well before the defendant arrives in a courtroom (or is even a 
defendant).51 
Importantly situated between Justices Souter’s and Kennedy’s 
opinions is meaningful common ground which can provide guidance to 
the Court’s holding in Vogt.  For instance, both Justices Souter and 
Kennedy view the Court’s Miranda doctrine as a constitutional doctrine.52  
                                                                                                                       
 44 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 45 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777–78 (explaining that though outside the Fifth Amendment’s 
core, these extensions are a complementary protection to that core). 
 46 Id. at 779. 
 47 Id. 
 48 That said, like Justice Souter, Justice Kennedy did not find merit in allowing a 
petitioner’s § 1983 claim to continue since the exclusion of the unwarned statements was 
already a sufficient remedy. See id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The exclusion of 
unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy.”) 
 49 Id. at 789–90. 
 50 Id. at 791. 
 51 Id. at 791 (“The Clause protects an individual from being forced to give answers 
demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to criminal 
liability in the future.”). See also Michael J. Sydney Mannheimer, Ripeness of Self-
Incrimination Clause Disputes, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1277 (noting that 
some cases have established that the privilege against self-incrimination “is a distinct and 
independent right not to have the government compel one to disclose self-incriminatory 
information in the first place.”). 
 52 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777–78 (Souter, J., concurring) (“we can make sense of a variety 
of Fifth Amendment holdings . . .  [such as] conditioning the admissibility on warnings and 
waivers to promote intelligent choices and to simply subsequent inquiry into 
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Indeed, both agreed that since remedies define the scope of the 
constitutional rights they protect, those remedies are themselves 
constitutional.53  At the same time, both Justices agreed that a violation of 
a constitutional remedy can, but need not always, support a § 1983 claim.54  
A violation of a Fifth Amendment rule can give rise to a § 1983 claim 
insofar as a § 1983 remedy would advance the purpose(s) of the Clause.55  
If the present remedy (exclusion) is already effective, both Justice Souter 
and Justice Kennedy thought, the need to bolster the Clause with a separate 
civil remedy is not required. 
If this shared ground accurately describes the Court’s current 
thoughts on this subject, then Vogt’s argument, that the use of his 
compelled testimony in a pretrial hearing should entitle him a § 1983 
remedy, may depend less on the constitutional nature of the immunity that 
attached to his statement. Rather, the Court, guided by the overlap between 
Justices Souter and Kennedy in Chavez, may find Vogt’s case to depend 
on the need for an additional civil remedy to defend the privilege—a 
question that would likely be answered in the negative if the Court finds 
that immunity (and its use and derivative use prohibition) is already a 
satisfactory remedy. 
IV. THE DIFFERENCE WITH IMMUNITY 
This remedial discretion located at the intersection of Justice Souter’s 
and Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Chavez, however, may have less 
purchase in Vogt.56  That is because Vogt, unlike Chavez, implicates a 
related yet distinct subject: immunity.  This difference may mean that 
violations of immunity, including pretrial violations of the same, can give 
rise to a § 1983 remedy. 
To Justice Thomas, however, immunity is no different than Miranda.  
Justice Thomas, again in Chavez, insisted that “a prior grant of immunity 
is essential to memorialize the fact that the testimony had indeed been 
                                                                                                                       
voluntariness”); Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The 
Miranda warning, as is now well settled, is a constitutional requirement adopted to reduce 
the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self-Incrimination Clause.”) 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (“To recognize such a 
constitutional cause of action for compensation would, of course, be well outside the core 
of Fifth Amendment protection, but that alone is not a sufficient reason to reject Martinez’s 
claim.”); id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The exclusion of 
unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient 
remedy.”). 
 55 For a list of the Clause’s purposes, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1967) (listing the “policies of the privilege” to include seven 
separate and distinct “aspirations”). 
 56 See supra notes 51–54. 
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compelled and therefore protected from use against the speaker in any 
‘criminal case’.”57  But that is all; both immunity and Miranda warnings, 
he emphasized, serve to “safeguard a constitutional right,” whose 
importance only arises after a criminal trial has begun.58  Thus, on their 
own, immunity and Miranda warnings lack any constitutional 
significance.59  The Government’s failure to honor either rule, even before 
a criminal case has begun, therefore, does not violate the Fifth Amendment 
and thus cannot provide the basis for a § 1983 remedy. 
But if this characterization of Miranda and immunity as non-
constitutional prophylactic rules is accurate, then it must also be the case 
that Congress can modify or wholly reject these doctrines altogether.  
After all, as long as the government does not use involuntary, self-
incriminatory testimony against a defendant at trial, there is nothing in the 
Fifth Amendment that requires a preemptive remedy like immunity.60  
However, this view, especially in the case of immunity, directly confronts 
the Court’s holding in Kastigar v. United States.61  Kastigar probed the 
constitutionality of the new federal immunity statute.62  The Court’s 
conclusion was that the newly-enacted statute63 is “as comprehensive as 
the protection afforded by the privilege.”64  Thus, to be consistent with the 
Clause, neither Congress nor state legislatures could install an immunity 
standard less protective than use/derivative use immunity.65 
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s view is a significant departure from 
traditional views of the Clause itself.  Before Chavez, it was well 
understood that the Clause protected two separate and distinct rights.  In 
addition to barring the use of a defendant’s compelled statements against 
her at trial, the Clause also barred “the government from using compulsion 
                                                                                                                       
 57 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 771–72. 
 58 Id. at 772. 
 59 Id. Of course, Thomas likely asserted this position to be consistent within his Chavez 
holding. If the privilege is only a trial right and if Miranda is merely a pretrial safeguard, 
then the same must be true for immunity. Any distinction between the two rules—with 
immunity representing something more serious than a pretrial safeguard—and his opinion 
could topple. 
 60 Id. at 773. 
 61 Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 593–
94 (1896); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) (both explicitly visiting the 
constitutionality of immunity doctrines, with Justice Frankfurter commentating in Ullman 
that immunity statutes have “become [a] part of our constitutional fabric[.]”). 
 62 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 442. 
 63 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003. 
 64 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449. 
 65 Id. 
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to obtain incriminating information from any person.”66 Put differently, 
the Clause is implicated anytime an individual is made to serve as a 
“witness against himself,” regardless of whether the witnessing was at the 
speaker’s own criminal trial or elsewhere.  The term “witness,” in other 
words, is not limited to criminal trials alone and is not modified or defined 
by its nearby companion: “any criminal case.” Instead, the term “any 
criminal case” is relevant only to whether the witness can properly invoke 
the privilege. The Clause’s reference to “any criminal case” is present to 
decide a witness’s ability to invoke the privilege regardless of whether an 
actual criminal trial does in fact follow. 
Finally, Justice Thomas’s view sits in tension with the way parties 
can litigate claims implicating the privilege against self-incrimination.67  
Typically, if a witness before a civil, administrative or Congressional 
inquiry invokes her privilege and her inquirers doubt the justification 
behind the invocation, she does not have to wait for a criminal prosecution 
against her to begin (or worse, to end) to resolve the dispute over her 
invocation.68  Instead, if a dispute over the witness’s invocation of the 
privilege arises, the parties can resolve their dispute in court immediately, 
in the form of a contempt proceeding brought against that witness.69  This 
way, the witness can avoid the “cruel trilemma” of either (1) having to 
testify in fear of criminal incrimination, (2) remain silent and risk penalty 
for contempt, or (3) lie on the stand and risk perjury.70  A preliminary 
hearing on the merits of the invocation, therefore, can reassure the witness 
that her statements will not be used against her.  More significantly, this 
procedure underscores that the privilege’s relevance begins well before a 
criminal trial starts. 
Yet, the plurality’s position in Chavez suggests that the contempt 
charge must wait until there is a subsequent criminal trial at which the 
prosecutor uses the witness’s compelled, involuntary statements.71 Only 
then, according to the Court, is the constitutional claim that underlines the 
contempt charge ripe for adjudication.72  But it would be odd to hold a 
witness in contempt until and ultimately if there is a subsequent criminal 
trial against the witness at which point she can litigate the merits of her 
                                                                                                                       
 66 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 327 (1976); see Garner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648, 653 (1976) (“the privilege protects against the use of compelled statements as 
well as guarantees the right to remain silent absent immunity.”) 
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 68 Mannheimer, supra note 51 at 1268. 
 69 See United States v. Mandjuano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976). 
 70 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (“our 
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt.”). 
 71 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 771–73. 
 72 Id. 
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invocation.73  Indeed, such procedural sequence would undermine the very 
import of the Clause—relieving a witness from making incriminatory 
statements. 
However persuasive this counter-argument may be, these cases and 
procedures do not answer the question of whether, despite immunity’s 
promise, a § 1983 plaintiff can receive relief when the government 
breaches its obligation not to use any compelled testimony or its fruits 
against her.  After all, in the mold of Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy’s 
thoughts in Chavez, immunity’s own exclusionary rule may be a sufficient 
remedy, undermining the need for any separate § 1983 relief.74  Well-
established distinctions between the Miranda and immunity doctrines, 
however, suggest that in cases of immunity a § 1983 remedy may be 
appropriate. 
Indeed, the first key distinction between Miranda warnings and 
immunity is the way in which each arises.  “[T]he Miranda warning . . . is 
a constitutional requirement adopted to reduce the risk of a coerced 
confession.”75  The police’s delivery of the warning does not etch in stone 
every statement that springs from a custodial interrogation as coercive or 
involuntary. Instead, the warning serves as a precaution to the interviewee 
and signals to him that he can freely invoke certain constitutional rights.76 
Miranda’s exclusionary rule therefore does not principally exist to show 
that un-Mirandized testimony was involuntary.77  It exists, in large part, to 
encourage the police to act a certain way (i.e., deliver the warnings and 
abstain from coercive interrogation practices).78 
Immunity, on the other hand, does not arise preemptively.  It emerges 
from the deliberate choice of the witness, who reasonably fears the 
potential incriminatory use of her own words,79 not to reveal her thoughts.  
Accordingly, immunity is the currency the government must use to 
purchase a witness’s constitutionally-protected silence.80  Its presence 
                                                                                                                       
 73 This surely raises a perplexing question: if a witness is held in contempt but there is 
no subsequent criminal trial at which she can litigate her disputed invocation of silence and 
thus the contempt charge, what happens to that contempt charge? 
 74 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. at 790 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 76 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466–67. 
 77 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1985). 
 78 Id. at 308 (“We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleged 
‘fruit’ of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an article of evidence 
but the accused’s own voluntary testimony. As in [Michigan v.] Tucker, the absence of any 
coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and 
deterrence—for a broader rule.”) 
 79 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that a reasonable belief 
of incrimination in a criminal case is necessary to invoke the Clause’s silence). 
 80 See Kastigar v. United States, 461 U.S. 441, 446–47 (1972). 
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signifies that any testimony protected by it is, by definition, involuntary.81 
And for that reason, the corresponding exclusion of immunized testimony 
exists to ensure that the witness is in approximately the same position as 
if she had remained silent.82  Immunity’s objective is not to reduce the risk 
of compulsion itself (as is the case with Miranda), but instead is to signal 
to prosecutors and investigators that they cannot use, directly or 
derivatively, any of the witness’s compelled testimony.83 
Considering this protection, immunity is far more protective than 
Miranda warnings.  Kastigar’s use/derivative use immunity protects the 
speaker’s words from direct use in a trial as well as from derivative use in 
any subsequent criminal investigation or prosecution.84 To that end, 
Kastigar stressed that even out-of-courtroom uses of immunized 
testimony can violate immunity, particularly if it guides the government 
to leads or evidence it otherwise would not have uncovered.85  Hence, an 
out-of-court use of immunized testimony can vacate an indictment86 or, if 
a court holds a post-trial Kastigar hearing,87 reverse a conviction.88 
By contrast, since the Court first announced the Miranda doctrine, it 
has carved out exceptions to the doctrine.  These carve-outs emphasize 
that the Miranda doctrine’s scope, unlike the Court’s treatment of 
immunity, is only as good as the goal (thwarting coercive interrogation 
practices) it serves.  Thus, in the context of Miranda warnings, “the need 
for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety 
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
                                                                                                                       
 81 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (“Testimony given in response to 
a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there is 
no question whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant’s will[.]”). 
 82 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 457 (citations omitted) (immunity’s aim is to place “the 
witness . . . in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege.”). 
 83 Chavez, 548 U.S.at 771–72 (“[A] grant of immunity is essential to memorialize the 
fact that the testimony had indeed been compelled.”) 
 84 Kastigar, 441 U.S. at 460. 
 85 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002). 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (remanding the 
case for further adjudication and noting that an indictment can be dismissed should the trial 
court find that the indictment was based on compelled testimony). 
 87 See United States v. Allen, 160 F.Supp.3d 684, 687 (2016) (noting that it is Second 
Circuit practice to hold a Kastigar hearing “following the conclusion of the defendants’ 
trials”).  A Kastigar hearing is a hearing where the government bears the “heavy burden” 
of affirmatively proving that all its trial evidence is independent of any compelled 
testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461–62. A trial court may also make this finding during 
or after the trial. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The Kastigar 
hearing may be held ‘pre-trial, post-trial, mid-trial (as evidence is offered), or [through] 
some combination of these methods,’ although ‘[a] pre-trial hearing is the most common 
choice.’”) (alteration in original). 
 88 See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 2017 WL 3040201 (2d Cir. July 19, 2017). 
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Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”89  The same, however, 
is not true with immunity. The Court has not permitted the government to 
breach immunity for public safety reasons. 
Similarly, an un-Mirandized statement made by the defendant is 
admissible at trial to impeach her.90  For example, in Harris v. New York, 
the Court noted that “[i]t does not follow from Miranda that evidence 
inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred 
for all purposes.”91  Meanwhile, the same is not true with immunity.  In 
fact, the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. Portash explicitly distinguished 
immunity from Miranda when it wrote that “a defendant’s compelled 
statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may 
not be put to any testimonial use,” including impeachment uses, that lay 
outside the prosecution’s case-in-chief.92  Since Portash, the Court has 
recognized a key substantive difference between immunity and Miranda 
warnings: while one (Miranda) flexes according to the prophylactic 
purpose it serves, the other (immunity) is absolute, barred from bending 
or adjusting to each situation.93 
In short, there are three takeaways from this discussion. First, 
immunity is more protective of individuals than Miranda.  The response 
to a breach of immunity is illustrative.  Any direct or indirect use of 
compelled testimony, however tangentially related to the trial evidence, 
may be grounds to nullify the entire case.  Uses of un-Mirandized 
testimony, in contrast, do not invite such strong medicine—a sensible 
outcome given that un-Mirandized testimony, on its own, is not an 
unimpeachable, irreversible marker of that testimony’s involuntariness.  
This voluntary/involuntary distinction underscores why the outcome in 
Chavez (the denial of § 1983 relief) may not replicate itself in Vogt, where 
the testimony at issue is compelled. 
Second, considering the purpose of immunity, adding a civil remedy 
atop the already robust protection of immunity is likely appropriate.  This 
is no doubt made clear by the fact that the government may violate 
immunity even when no subsequent trial of the immunized person occurs.  
In other words, the Court’s immunity jurisprudence has emphasized that 
there is no constitutional difference between pretrial violations and trial 
                                                                                                                       
 89 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
 90 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
 91 Id. at 224 (adding that the shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior 
inconsistent utterances). 
 92 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 93 See also Elstad, supra note 58 at 317–18 (holding that the Fifth Amendment does 
not require the suppression of a confession made after proper Miranda warnings solely 
because an earlier voluntary, but unwarned, admission of the defendant). 
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violations of immunity.  To the extent that a trial violation of immunity 
can raise a § 1983 action—a proposition that even Justice Thomas’s 
opinion in Chavez would endorse—then so too must pretrial violations of 
it.94  Arguably, this is true even if no subsequent trial follows.95 
Third, since immunity is as much a constitutional guarantee as the 
Clause’s undisputed trial right, the scope of the phrases “any criminal 
case” or “a witness against himself” must be as extensive as the uses and 
derivative uses barred under immunity.  The Supreme Court, in other 
words, would pervert the Clause should they hold, on the one hand, that 
an indictment’s or case’s dismissal is necessary where a prosecutor 
violates immunity outside the courtroom, but then, on the other hand, limit 
violations of the Clause only to events inside the courtroom and at trial.  
Unless the Court wishes to unwind the strong positions it has taken with 
respect to its immunity doctrine since Kastigar, the two concepts must be 
coextensive with one another. 
V. CLOSING THE LOOP 
Unfortunately, these points alone do not answer whether an 
immunized statement’s use in a pretrial hearing violates immunity and 
therein the Clause.  Thus, to determine if Vogt is entitled to relief, the 
Court should (and must) decide if the use of a compelled statement in a 
pretrial probable cause hearing is in fact a barred use under immunity.  At 
bottom, this is a question about the scope of Kastigar’s protection. 
The chief hurdle in answering this question is deciphering exactly 
what the Court meant when it barred uses and derivative uses in Kastigar.  
Today, federal courts are divided on that subject.  Some courts have 
stressed that to uphold the language and spirit of Kastigar, the government 
can make no uses of immunized testimony whatsoever, regardless of 
whether that is at or before trial.96  For instance, one circuit has held that a 
                                                                                                                       
 94 There are no published cases in which a § 1983 plaintiff has successfully sued a 
municipality for the subsequent use of her compelled, immunized testimony at trial. Thus, 
there is no direct case to cite for that proposition. But the suggestion that Justice Thomas, 
would support § 1983 relief, at least in theory, derives from his dicta in Chavez.  See 
Chavez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2005) (“ . . . a violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a 
criminal case.”) (emphasis in original). 
 95 As discussed in Part IV below, this is the central question in this case: whether 
pretrial violations of immunity, with no subsequent criminal trial at which the pretrial 
violations are revealed, is enough to raise a § 1983 claim. 
 96 See United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 894–95 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that the 
government did not discharge its heavy Kastigar burden in part because the assigned trial 
attorney had “access” to compelled testimony). See also United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 
716, 721 (finding that the government met its Kastigar burden partly because “a primary 
concern of Kastigar and the Department of Justice Guidelines, that mere access to 
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trial prosecutor’s inadvertent exposure to immunized testimony prior to 
trial was sufficient to violate immunity, even when all of the government’s 
trial evidence was provably independent of any immunized testimony.97  
This sweeping position vindicates one reading of Kastigar: immunity must 
leave the defendant “in substantially the same position as if the 
witness . . . claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of 
immunity.”98  Any advantages prosecutors take from immunized 
testimony—whether for strategic or evidentiary purposes—are prohibited. 
Another group of federal circuits disagree with this expansive 
reading. These courts hold that immunity is strictly contained to 
“evidentiary” uses of any immunized testimony.99  Where the government 
can prove the independence of its trial evidence from the defendant’s 
immunized testimony, any other uses—however significant to the case’s 
presentation—are allowed.  Prosecutorial uses of immunized testimony 
that are not a “link in the chain of [the trial] evidence” are permitted.100  
These uses can include “focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate 
prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning 
cross-examination,”101 inducing another witness to speak,102 and other 
general trial strategy.  Allowing these uses, these circuits hold, 
acknowledges another point made by the Kastigar Court: the mere 
presence of state-granted immunity should not alone bar the prosecution 
of a previously-compelled defendant.103  Exposure to immunized 
testimony, to the extent it has not tainted the trial evidence’s independence, 
is not fatal to the government’s case.  Whether Vogt can receive relief 
likely hangs on which view of immunity the Court takes.  If it adopts the 
first view, the use of Vogt’s immunized statement in a probable cause 
hearing likely violates the Clause.  This is especially so since the State of 
                                                                                                                       
immunized information may catalyze chains of investigation or subliminally affect 
decisions to prosecute, is not even in issue here”). 
 97 United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 309–10 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 98 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457 (1972). 
 99 United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.  Cozzi, 613 
F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.  2010) (citing United States v. Schmidigall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1529 
(11th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.  1988) (“[W]e have held that the government  must  
prove  that  it  ‘relied solely’ on evidence from legitimate independent sources.’”); United 
States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Thus, in the case sub judice, the 
government’s burden under Kastigar was simply to prove that the evidence presented to 
the grand jury (and ultimately the evidence  utilized at trial) was derived from legitimate, 
independent sources.”). 
 100 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000). 
 101 McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311. 
 102 United States v. Mapes, 59 MJ 60, 69 (2003). 
 103 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (“The privilege has never been construed to mean that one 
who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.”). 
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Kansas’s decision to bring a criminal matter against Vogt relied in part on 
Vogt’s immunized statements provided by the City.104  Vogt, in short, was 
made worse off by the state’s use of his immunized statements.  In 
contrast, a Court that adopts the second view may find the absence of any 
violation. The absence of a criminal trial, as was the case in Vogt, means 
the absence of any evidentiary uses.  Thus, because there was no trial 
evidence, the government is not required to prove its evidence’s 
independence.  Consequently, with no evidence, there can be no immunity 
violation, and this is the case no matter how clear the government’s pretrial 
use of any immunized testimony was or how obvious its intent to use 
(directly or derivatively) that immunized testimony at trial was. 
Further instructing which one of these views the Court may take in 
Vogt is a separate question: when precisely does an immunity violation 
ripen?  If the Court holds that an immunity violation only ripens at trial 
and not before—a view that comports with Justice Thomas’s Chavez 
opinion that a violation of the Clause can only occur after the initiation of 
criminal proceeding—the Court will likely favor the second approach.  
Vogt, therefore, may not be entitled to the relief he seeks. This view has 
some support. In perhaps the most (in)famous case implicating the 
boundaries of immunity, United States v. North, the D.C. Circuit was 
asked to determine if certain trial witnesses’ exposure105 to the defendant’s 
congressionally-compelled testimony qualified as a breach of immunity.106  
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit held that the exposure was a barred “indirect 
evidentiary” use,107 with the use occurring when the tainted witness was 
put on the stand at trial, not at the time of the witnesses’ exposure.108  A 
violation could not ripen, the court implied, until the trial. 
But this view may not comport with other cases, which suggest a 
breach can also occur whenever the immunized statements certify a case 
to proceed to trial.  Most notably, if immunized words of the indicted 
defendant are used (directly or derivatively) before a grand jury to return 
that indictment, the indictment must be dismissed.109  In like manner, a 
                                                                                                                       
 104 Vogt, 844 F.3d 1235, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 105 This exposure was independent of any prosecutorial conduct. In other words, the 
prosecution did not participate, encourage, or condone the witnesses’ exposure to the 
defendant’s compelled testimony. Rather, the witnesses watched North’s testimony on 
their own. 
 106 United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 107 Id. at 860. 
 108 Id. at 856–58. 
 109 See, Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 171, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
use of a coerced statement before a trial or grand jury can violate the Fifth Amendment); 
Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that where “[a] coerced 
statement . . . has been relied upon to file formal charges against the declarant . . . ” the 
Fifth Amendment has been violated). 
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court’s reliance on immunized testimony in a probable cause hearing, 
which like a grand jury certifies the case’s merits, may be satisfactory 
grounds for an immunity violation.  Barred uses, therefore, occur at 
hearings that initiate a criminal case, not just at the criminal trial itself.110 
Consequently, an immunity violation can ripen before a trial begins, 
especially if the immunized testimony is used to certify a case’s merits.  
Applied in Vogt, the absence of any subsequent trial may not undermine 
Vogt’s § 1983 claim that the City violated his privilege against self-
incrimination; indeed, Vogt may therefore be entitled to relief. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Einstein once suggested that if he had an hour to correctly solve a 
problem, he would spend the first 55 minutes trying to ask the right 
question and the remaining five minutes to solve it.  If Einstein’s wisdom 
is correct, then the Court may need to spend more time finding the right 
question to ask in Vogt.  As this Essay has argued, the correct question to 
ask in Vogt is not what the Founders meant when they used the words “any 
criminal case” or “witness against himself.”  Rather, the correct inquiries 
are, first, is the Court’s immunity doctrine a constitutional guarantee?  
Second, if immunity is in fact a constitutional guarantee, should the 
interpretation of the phrases “any criminal case” and “a witness against 
himself” be as extensive as the bounds of use/derivative use immunity?  
And third, does that immunity bar direct or indirect uses of immunized 
testimony in a pretrial probable cause hearing, particularly when there was 
no subsequent criminal trial (or conviction) that followed? 
While the first and second questions’ answer should be “yes,” the 
third question unfortunately does not produce a clear answer. Thus, it 
should be the focus of the Court’s visit in Vogt.  Indeed, as discussed 
above, circuits are split over the protection guaranteed under immunity.  
The absence of any criminal trial in the record here no doubt complicates 
the case.  It requires the Court to decide not only the type of use 
(evidentiary or non-evidentiary) made in Vogt, but whether, in the absence 
of any actual trial, whether that use alone has ripened into a barred use 
under the Clause.  Whatever the outcome, probing the scope of immunity 
is necessary, this Essay believes, to decide the fate of Vogt’s § 1983 claim. 
                                                                                                                       
 110 Note that if this is the case, then the extension of “any criminal case” to bail hearings 
or even suppression hearings may not be appropriate. Unlike a grand jury or probable cause 
hearing, these hearings have little connection to the case’s merits or its continuance. In this 
sense, use/derivative use immunity may permit the compelled statement’s use(s) in bail or 
suppression hearings. This permission, however, may turn on the breadth of a 
nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony, a topic not discussed thoroughly here. 
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Regardless of the outcome, addressing these questions will provide 
much-needed clarity to prosecutors and the defense bar about and what the 
government can (or cannot do) with immunized testimony.  Should the 
Court address these issues, any decision will likely come as welcomed 
guidance, particularly as immunity becomes increasingly significant 
amidst probing independent investigations, the rise in complex criminal 
prosecutions that often rely on witness’s immunized testimony, an 
increase in cross-border criminal prosecutions that may intersect with 
foreign-compelled testimony,111 and a continued, determined focus of 
individual, as opposed to corporate, criminal responsibility by the Justice 
Department.112 
                                                                                                                       
 111 See United States v. Conti, 864 F.3d 63, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that testimony 
compelled by a foreign sovereign, independent of any U.S. government action, implicates 
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination when that involuntary 
testimony is used in a U.S. criminal case).  See also Neal Modi, Note, Towards an 
International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s 
Compelled to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961, 968 (2017) (noting the rise in 
cross-border criminal investigations in which foreign sovereigns have compelled a 
potential defendant under threat of sanction). 
 112 See Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. to Focus on Individuals in Cases of Corporate 
Misconduct, Wash. Post (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-focus-on-
individuals-in-cases-of-corporate-misconduct/ 2015/09/10/c14b0ec0-57db-11e5-abe9-
27d53f250b11_story.html. 
